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Privacy of users in Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks goes
far beyond their current usage and is a fundamental re-
quirement to the adoption of P2P protocols for legal us-
age. In a climate of cold war between P2P filesharing
users and anti-piracy groups, more and more users are
moving to anonymizing networks in an attempt to hide
their identity. However, when not designed to protect
users information, a P2P protocol often leaks informa-
tion that compromises the identity of its users.
BitTorrent is a P2P filesharing protocol that is daily
used by millions of users but that has not been designed
to protect the anonymity of its users. Indeed, it has re-
cently been shown that an adversary can continuously
spy, i.e., collect the IP-to-contents mapping, on most Bit-
Torrent users of the Internet and from a single machine
[1]. In addition to spy on BitTorrent users, an attacker
might be able to exploit BitTorrent control messages to
de-anonymize a user behind an anonymizing network
such as Tor.
Tor relies on onion routing over an overlay network
maintained by volunteers to anonymize TCP applica-
tions such as web browsing, P2P filesharing, etc. To
reach the Internet via Tor, an application selects 3 Tor
nodes at random and then first encrypts its messages
with the key shared with the last node (exit node), then
with the key of the 2nd node, and finally with the key of
the 1st node. The 3 Tor nodes that route a user’s mes-
sages form a circuit and all TCP streams created by that
user during a 10-minutes period will be multiplexed into
one, or a few circuits. Each Tor node in a circuit then de-
crypts/encrypts the messages after routing them to/from
the Internet. Onion routing thus guarantees that no Tor
node knows both the source IP address and the payload
of a message.
A BitTorrent user may use Tor to (1) connect to a
server (tracker) to collect lists of peers sharing a file, (2)
connect to other peers to distribute a file, or (3) both.
In this proposal, we instrument 6 exit nodes for a pe-
riod of 23 days to demonstrate that an attacker can de-
anonymize BitTorrent users for any of the 3 aforemen-
tioned usages by volunteering to maintain an exit node
and eavesdropping appropriate BitTorrent control mes-
sages. In addition, as all streams are multiplexed into
the same circuit, we show that de-anonymizing one Bit-
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Torrent stream allows to potentially de-anonymize other
applications such as web browsing. We propose 3 at-
tacks to de-anonymize BitTorrent users on Tor.
Our first attack consists in inspecting the payload of
some BitTorrent control messages and search for the
public IP address of a user. In particular, the announce
messages that a client sends to the tracker to collect a list
of peers distributing a content, and the extended hand-
shake messages that some clients send right after the
application handshake sometimes contain the public IP
address of the user. However, we have not tested the ac-
curacy of the public IP address contained in those mes-
sages so we do not consider them in the following.
Our second attack consists in rewriting the list of
peers returned by the tracker to include the IP address
of a peer that we control. As the user will then directly
connect to the peer controlled by the attacker, the latter
can de-anonymize the user by inspecting the IP header.
Whereas this hijacking attack is accurate, it only works
when the user relies on Tor only to connect to the tracker.
Finally, the third attack consists in exploiting the DHT
to search for the public IP address of a user. Indeed,
whereas Tor does not support UDP, BitTorrent’s DHT
uses UDP for transport and when a BitTorrent client fails
to contact the DHT using its Tor interface, it reverts to
its public interface hence publishing its public IP address
into the DHT. As the content identifier and the port num-
ber of a client transit through the exit node, and port
numbers are uniformly distributed, an attacker can use
this information to identify a BitTorrent user in the DHT.
This DHT attack is very accurate and works even when
the peer uses Tor to connect to other peers.
Using the hijacking and DHT attacks, we de-
anonymized and profiled close to 9, 000 public IP ad-
dresses of BitTorrent users on Tor. In particular, we have
exploited the multiplexing of streams from different ap-
plications into the same circuit to profile the web brows-
ing habits of the BitTorrent users on Tor.
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